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ABSTRACT
Nature is in constant flux, so animals must account for changes in their environment when making
decisions. How animals learn the timescale of such changes and adapt their decision strategies
accordingly is not well understood. Recent psychophysical experiments have shown humans and
other animals can achieve near-optimal performance at two alternative forced choice (2AFC) tasks
in dynamically changing environments. Characterization of performance requires the derivation and
analysis of computational models of optimal decision-making policies on such tasks. We review recent
theoretical work in this area, and discuss how models compare with subjects’ behavior in tasks where
the correct choice or evidence quality changes in dynamic, but predictable, ways.
Introduction
To translate stimuli into decisions, animals interpret sequences of observations based on their prior
experiences1. However, the world is fluid: The context in which a decision is made, the quality of the
evidence, and even the best choice can change before a judgment is formed, or an action taken. A source
of water can dry up, or a nesting site can become compromised. But even when not fully predictable,
changes often have statistical structure: Some changes are rare, others are frequent, and some are more
likely to occur at specific times. How have animals adapted their decision strategies to a world that is
structured, but in flux?
Classic computational, behavioral, and neurophysiological studies of decision-making mostly involved
tasks with fixed or statistically stable evidence1–3. To characterize the neural computations underlying
decision strategies in changing environments, we must understand the dynamics of evidence accumulation4.
This requires novel theoretical approaches. While normative models are a touchstone for theoretical
studies5, 6, even for simple dynamic tasks the computations required to optimally translate evidence
into decisions can become prohibitive7. Nonetheless, quantifying how behavior differs from normative
predictions helps elucidate the assumptions animals use to make decisions8, 9.
We review normative models and compare them with experimental data from two alternative forced
choice (2AFC) tasks in dynamic environments. Our focus is on tasks where subjects passively observe
streams of evidence, and the evidence quality or correct choice can vary within or across trials. Humans
and animals adapt their decision strategies to account for such volatile environments, often resulting in
performance that is nearly optimal on average. However, neither the computations they use to do so nor
their neural implementations are well understood.
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Figure 1. Two alternative forced choice (2AFC) tasks in dynamic environments. (A) Possible
timescales of environmental dynamics: 1) The state (S+ or S−), or the quality of the evidence (e.g.,
coherence of random dot motion stimulus) may switch within a trial5, 6, 10, or 2) across trials11–13; 3) The
hazard rate, h, can change across blocks of trials6, 9. (B) In a dynamic 2AFC task, a two-state Markov
chain with hazard rate h determines the state. (Bi) The current state (correct hypothesis) is either S+ (red)
or S− (yellow). (Bii) Conditional densities of the observations, f±(ξ ) = P(ξ |S±), shown as Gaussians
with means ±µ and standard deviation σ . (C) Evidence discounting is shaped by the environmental
timescale: (Top) In slow environments, posterior probabilities over the states, P(S±|ξ1:4), are more
strongly influenced by past observations, ξ1:3, (darker shades of the observations, ξi, indicate higher
weight) and thus points to S+. (Bottom) If changes are fast, beliefs depend more strongly on the current
observation, ξ4, which outweighs older evidence and points to S−.
Optimal evidence accumulation in changing environments
Normative models of decision-making typically assume subjects are Bayesian agents14, 15 that probabilisti-
cally compute their belief of the state of the world by combining fresh evidence with previous knowledge.
Beyond normative models, notions of optimality require a defined objective. For instance, an observer may
need to report the location of a sound16, or the direction of a moving cloud of dots5, and is rewarded if the
report is correct. Combined with a framework to translate probabilities or beliefs into actions, normative
models provide a rational way to maximize the net rewards dictated by the environment and task. Thus an
optimal model combines normative computations with a policy that translates a belief into the optimal
action.
How are normative models and optimal policies in dynamic environments characterized? Older
observations have less relevance in rapidly changing environments than in slowly changing ones. Ideal
observers account for environmental changes by adjusting the rate at which they discount prior information
when making inferences and decisions17. In Box 1 we show how, in a normative model, past evidence is
nonlinearly discounted at a rate dependent on environmental volatility5, 17. When this volatility8 or the
underlying evidence quality13, 18 are unknown, they must also be inferred.
In 2AFC tasks, subjects accumulate evidence until they decide on one of two choices either freely or
when interrogated. In these tasks, fluctuations can act on different timescales (Fig. 1a): 1) on each trial
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Box 1 – Normative evidence accumulation in dynamic environments.
Discrete time. At times t1:n an observer receives a sequence of noisy observations, ξ1:n, of the state S1:n,
governed by a two-state Markov process (Fig. 1b). Observation likelihoods, f±(ξ ) = P(ξ |S±), determine
the belief (log-likelihood ratio: LLR), yn = log
P(Sn=S+|ξ1:n)
P(Sn=S−|ξ1:n) , after observation n. If the observations are
conditionally independent, the LLR can be updated recursively5, 17:
yn = log
f+(ξn)
f−(ξn)︸ ︷︷ ︸
current evidence
+ log
(1−h)exp(yn−1)+h
hexp(yn−1)+(1−h)︸ ︷︷ ︸
discounted prior belief
, (1)
where h is the hazard rate (probability the state switches between times tn−1 and tn). The belief prior to
the observation at time tn, yn−1, is discounted according to the environment’s volatility h. When h= 0,
Eq. (1) reduces to the classic drift-diffusion model (DDM), and evidence is accumulated perfectly over
time. When h= 1/2, only the latest observation, ξn, is informative. For 0 < h< 1/2, prior beliefs are
discounted, so past evidence contributes less to the current belief, yn, corresponding to leaky integration.
When 1/2 < h< 1, the environment alternates.
Continuous time. When tn− tn−1 = ∆t 1, and the hazard rate is defined ∆t ·h, LLR evolution can be
approximated by the stochastic differential equation5, 17:
dy= g(t)dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
drift
+ dWt︸︷︷︸
noise
−2hsinh(y)dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
nonlinear filter
, (2)
where g(t) jumps between +g and−g at a rate h,Wt is a zero mean Wiener process with variance ρ2, and
the nonlinear filter −2hsinh(y) optimally discounts prior evidence. In contrast to the classic continuum
DDM, the belief, y(t), does not increase indefinitely, but saturates due to evidence-discounting.
(Fig. 1b,c)5, 6, 2) unpredictably within only some trials19, 20, 3) between trials in a sequence11, 16, or 4)
gradually across long blocks of trials21. We review findings in the first three cases and compare them to
predictions of normative model.
Within trial changes promote leaky evidence accumulation
Normative models of dynamic 2AFC tasks (Fig. 1b,c and 2a, Box 1) exhibit adaptive, nonlinear discounting
of prior beliefs at a rate adapted to expectations of the environment’s volatility (Fig. 1c), and saturation of
certainty about each hypothesis, regardless of how much evidence is accumulated (Fig. 2a). In contrast,
ideal observers in static environments weigh all past observations equally, and their certainty grows
without bound until a decision1, 3. Also, in dynamic environments, the performance of ideal observers at
change points – times when the correct choice switches – depends sensitively on environmental volatility
(Fig. 2aiii). In slowly changing environments, optimal observers assume that changes are rare, and thus
adapt slowly after one has occured. In contrast, in rapidly changing environments, observers quickly
update their belief after a change point.
The responses of humans and other animals on tasks in which the correct choice changes stochastically
during a trial share features with normative models: In a random dot-motion discrimination (RDMD) task,
where the motion direction switches at unsignaled changepoints, humans adapt their decision-making
process to the switching (hazard) rate (Fig. 2ai)5. However, on average, they overestimate the change rates
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Figure 2. Dynamic State Changes. (A) State changes within trials in a (Ai) random dot motion
discrimination (RDMD) task, in which drift direction switches throughout the trial5, and (Aii) dynamic
auditory clicks task, in which the side of the higher rate stream alternates during the trial6. (Aiii) An ideal
observer’s LLR (See Eq. (2) in Box 1) when the hazard rate is low (top panels: h=0.1Hz) and high
(bottom panels: h=1Hz). Immediately after state changes, the belief typically does not match the state. (B)
State changes across trials. (Bi) In the triangles task5, samples (star) are drawn from one of two Gaussian
distributions (yellow and red clouds) whose centers are represented by triangles. The observers must
choose the current center (triangle). (Bii) In an RDMD task, dots on each trial move in one of two
directions (colored arrows) chosen according to a two-state Markov process. Depending on the switching
rate, trial sequences may include excessive repetitions (Top), or alternations (Bottom). (Biii) (Top)
Responses can be biased by decisions from previous trials. (Bottom) Probabilistic feedback (‘O’: correct;
‘X’: incorrect) affects initial bias (e.g., trials 3, 4, and 5), even when not completely reliable.
of rapidly switching environments and underestimate the change rates of slowly switching environments.
In a related experiment (Fig 2aii), rats were trained to identify which of two Poisson auditory click streams
arrived at a higher rate22. When the identity of the higher-frequency stream switched unpredictably during
a trial, trained rats discounted past clicks near-optimally on average, suggesting they learned to account
for latent environmental dynamics6.
However, behavioral data are not uniquely explained by normative models. Linear approximations of
normative models perform nearly identically17, and, under certain conditions, fit behavioral data well5, 6, 23.
Do subjects implement normative decision policies or simpler strategies that approximate them? Subjects’
decision strategies can depend strongly on task design and vary across individuals5, 9, suggesting a need
for sophisticated model selection techniques. Recent research suggests normative models can be robustly
distinguished from coarser approximations when task difficulty and volatility are carefully tuned24.
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Subjects account for correlations between trials by biasing initial beliefs
Natural environments can change over timescales that encompass multiple decisions. However, in many
experimental studies, task parameters are fixed or generated independently across trials, so evidence from
previous trials is irrelevant. Even so, subjects often use decisions and information from earlier trials to
(serially) bias future choices25–27, reflecting ingrained assumptions about cross-trial dependencies21, 28.
To understand how subjects adapt to constancy and flux across trials, classic 2AFC experiments have
been extended to include correlated cross-trial choices (Fig. 2b) where both evidence accumulated during
a trial, and probabilistic reward provide information that can be used to guide subsequent decisions16, 29.
When a Markov process30 (Fig. 1b) is used to generate correct choices, human observers adapt to these
trial-to-trial correlations and their response times are accurately modeled by drift diffusion11 or ballistic
models16 with biased initial conditions.
Feedback or decisions across correlated trials impact different aspects of normative models31 including
accumulation speed (drift)32–34, decision bounds11, or the initial belief on subsequent trials12, 35, 36. Given
a sequence of dependent but statistically identical trials, optimal observers should adjust their initial belief
and decision threshold16, 28, but not their accumulation speed in cases where difficulty is fixed across
trials18. Thus, optimal models predict that observers should, on average, respond more quickly, but not
more accurately28. Empirically, humans12, 35, 36 and other animals29 do indeed often respond faster on
repeat trials, which can often be modeled by per trial adjustments in initial belief. Furthermore, this bias
can result from explicit feedback or subjective estimates, as demonstrated in studies where no feedback is
provided (Fig. 2biii)16, 36.
The mechanism by which human subjects carry information across trials remains unclear. Different
models fit to human subject data have represented intertrial dependencies using initial bias, changes in
drift rate, and updated decision thresholds11, 16, 34. Humans also tend to have strong preexisting repetition
biases, even when such biases are suboptimal25–27. Can this inherent bias be overcome through training?
The answer may be attainable by extending the training periods of humans or nonhuman primates5, 9, or
using novel auditory decision tasks developed for rodents6, 29. Ultimately, high throughput experiments
may be needed to probe how ecologically adaptive evidence accumulation strategies change with training.
Time-varying thresholds account for heterogeneities in task difficulty
Optimal decision policies can also be shaped by unpredictable changes in decision difficulty. For instance,
task difficulty can be titrated by varying the signal-to-noise ratio of the stimulus, so more observations
are required to obtain the same level of certainty. Theoretical studies have shown that it is optimal to
change one’s decision criterion within a trial when the difficulty of a decision varies across trials13, 18, 37.
The threshold that determines how much evidence is needed to make a decision should vary during the
trial (Fig. 3a) to incorporate up-to-date estimates of trial difficulty18. There is evidence that subjects use
time-varying decision boundaries to balance speed and accuracy on such tasks38, 39.
Dynamic programming can be used to derive optimal decision policies when trial-to-trial difficulties
or reward sizes change. For instance, when task difficulty changes across trials in a RDMD task, opti-
mal decisions are modeled by a DDM with a time-varying boundary, in agreement with reaction time
distributions of humans and monkeys18, 38. Both dynamic programming18 and parameterized function38, 40
based models suggest decreasing bounds maximize reward rates (Fig. 3a,b). This dynamic criterion helps
participants avoid noise-triggered early decisions or extended deliberations18. An exception to this trend
was identified in trial sequences without trials of extreme difficulty13, in which case the optimal strategy
used a threshold that increased over time.
Time-varying decision criteria also arise when subjects perform tasks where information quality
5/11
A Dynamic Evidence Quality Model
B Across Trial Quality Changes
C Within Trial Quality Changes
Easy Hard
i ii
L
L
R
Time (s)
0 6
4
8
12
16
L
L
R
Time (s)
3
4
2
1
0
0 1
Hard 
Easy
QEasy QHard
Psame
i ii
PsamePswitch
Pswitch
Figure 3. Dynamic Evidence Quality. (A) Trial-to-trial two-state Markovian evidence quality
switching: (Ai) Evidence quality switches between easy (Qeasy) and hard (Qhard) with probability Pswitch.
(Aii) Optimal decision policies require time-varying decision thresholds. An observer who knows the
evidence quality (easy or hard) uses a fixed threshold (grey traces, dashed lines) to maximize reward rate,
but thresholds must vary when evidence quality is initially unknown (black trace, green gradient). (B)
Different triangle task difficulties (from Fig. 2Ai): Triangles are spaced further apart in easy trials
compared to hard trials. (C) Changes in quality within trials: (Ci) An RDMD task in which the drift
coherence increases mid-trial, providing stronger evidence later in the trial. (Cii) The corresponding LLR
increases slowly early in the trial, and more rapidly once evidence becomes stronger.
changes within trials (Fig. 3c)40, especially when initially weak evidence is followed by stronger evidence
later in the trial. However, most studies use heuristic models to explain psychophysical data19, 20, suggest-
ing a need for normative model development in these contexts. Decision threshold switches have also been
observed in humans performing changepoint detection tasks, whose difficulty changes from trial-to-trial41,
and in a model of value-based decisions, where the reward amounts change between trials42. Overall,
optimal performance on tasks in which reward structure or decision difficulty changes across trials require
time-varying decision criteria, and subject behavior approximates these normative assumptions.
One caveat is that extensive training or obvious across-trial changes are needed for subjects to learn
optimal solutions. A meta-analysis of multiple studies showed that fixed threshold DDMs fit human
behavior well when difficulty changes between trials were hard to perceive43. A similar conclusion
holds when changes occur within trials44. However, when nonhuman primates are trained extensively
on tasks where difficulty variations were likely difficult to perceive, they appear to learn a time-varying
criterion strategy45. Humans also exhibit time-varying criteria in reward-free trial sequences where
6/11
interrogations are interspersed with free responses46. Thus, when task design makes it difficult to perceive
task heterogeneity or learn the optimal strategy, subjects seem to use fixed threshold criteria43, 44. In
contrast, with sufficient training45, or when changes are easy to perceive46, subjects can learn adaptive
threshold strategies.
Questions remain about how well normative models describe subject performance when difficulty
changes across or within trials. How distinct do task difficulty extremes need to be for subjects to use
optimal models? No systematic study has quantified performance advantages of time-varying decision
thresholds. If they do not confer a significant advantage, the added complexity of dynamic thresholds may
discourage their use.
When and how are normative computations learned and achieved?
Except in simple situations, or with overtrained animals, subjects can at best approximate computations
of an ideal observer14. Yet, the studies we reviewed suggest that subjects often learn to do so effectively.
Humans appear to use a process resembling reinforcement learning to learn the structure and parameters of
decision task environments47. Such learning tracks a gradient in reward space, and subjects adapt rapidly
when the task structure changes48. Subjects also switch between different near-optimal models when mak-
ing inferences, which may reflect continuous task structure learning9. However, these learning strategies
appear to rely on reward and could be noisier when feedback is probabilistic or absent. Alternatively,
subjects may ignore feedback and learn from evidence accumulated within or across trials28, 46.
Strategy learning can be facilitated by using simplified models. For example, humans appear to use
sampling strategies that approximate, but are simpler than, optimal inference9, 49. Humans also behave in
ways that limit performance by, for instance, not changing their mind when faced with new evidence50.
This confirmation bias may reflect interactions between decision and attention related systems that are
difficult to train away51. Cognitive biases may also arise due to suboptimal applications of normative
models52. For instance, recency bias can reflect an incorrect assumption of trial dependencies53. Subjects
seem to continuously update latent parameters (e.g., hazard rate), perhaps assuming that these parameters
are always changing21, 29.
The adaptive processes we have discussed occur on disparate timescales, and thus likely involve neural
mechanisms that interact across scales. Task structure learning occurs over many sessions (days), while
the volatility of the environment and other latent parameters can be learned over many trials (hours)6, 49.
Trial-to-trial dependencies likely require memory processes that span minutes, while within trial changes
require much faster adaptation (milliseconds to seconds).
This leaves us with a number of questions: How does the brain bridge timescales to learn and
implement adaptive evidence integration? This likely requires coordinating fast neural activity changes
with slower changes in network architecture8. Studies of decision tasks in static environments suggest that
a subject’s belief and ultimate choice is reflected in evolving neural activity1–3, 54. It is unclear whether
similar processes represent adaptive evidence accumulation, and, if so, how they are modulated.
Conclusions
As the range of possible descriptive models grows with task complexity8, 49, optimal observer models
provide a framework for interpreting behavioral data5, 6, 34. However, understanding the computations
subjects use on dynamic tasks, and when they depart from optimality, requires both careful comparison of
models to data and comparisons between model classes55.
While we mainly considered optimality defined by performance, model complexity may be just as
important in determining the computations used by experimental subjects56. Complex models, while more
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accurate, may be difficult to learn, hard to implement, and offer little advantage over simpler ones8, 9.
Moreover, predictions of more complex models typically have higher variance, compared to the higher
bias of more parsimonious models, resulting in a trade-off between the two9.
Invasive approaches for probing adaptive evidence accumulation are a work in progress57, 58. However,
pupillometry has been shown to reflect arousal changes linked to a mismatch between expectations and
observations in dynamic environments10, 27, 59. Large pupil sizes reflect high arousal after a perceived
change, resulting in adaptive changes in evidence weighting. Thus, pupillometry may provide additional
information for identifying computations underlying adaptive evidence accumulation.
Understanding how animals make decisions in volatile environments requires careful task design.
Learning and implementing an adaptive evidence accumulation strategy needs to be both rewarding and
sufficiently simple so subjects do not resign themselves to simpler computations43, 44. A range of studies
have now shown that mammals can learn to use adaptive decision-making strategies in dynamic 2AFC
tasks5, 6. Building on these approaches, and using them to guide invasive studies with mammals offers
promising new ways of understanding the neural computations that underlie our everyday decisions.
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